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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 state-
ment of the nature of the case. 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 state-
ment of the disposition by the Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the award of the Industrial 
Commission dated October 25, 1974 affirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 state-
ment of facts. 
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POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID 
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETER-
MINING THE APPLICANTS INJURIES AND 
COMPENSATION. 
Learned counsel for the plaintiff very adequately 
covered the statutory ground and general principles con-
cerning the Special Fund under U.C.A. 35-l-68# 69. Respon-
dents therefore will endeavor not to be repetitive in these 
areas. 
The basic issue plaintiff raises on appeal is whether 
the Commission^ guidelines are arbitrary in interpreting 
U.C.A. 35-1-69. The pertinent part of that statute that 
creates difficulty in interpretation includes: 
"35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting 
in permanent incapacity—Basis of Com-
pensation—Special fund—Training of 
employee—(1) If any employee who has 
previously incurred a permanent incapa-
city by accidental injury, disease, or 
congenital causes, sustains an industirial 
injury for which compensation and medical 
care is provided by this title that re-
sults in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have 
incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing incapacity, compensation and 
medical care, which medical care and 
other related items are outlined in 
section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the 
basis of the combined injuries, but the 
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liability of the employer for such com-
pensation and medical care shall be for 
the industrial injury only and the re-
mainder shall be paid out of the special 
fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) 
hereinafter referred to as the "special 
fund"... (Emphasis added). 
The language "substantially greater" poses distinct 
problems of interpretation for the Industrial Commission, as 
the phrase is unduly broad and general. 
The commission has long struggled with the meaning of 
this phrase, and has to the best of its ability, attempted to 
evaluate claims on a case by case basis, rather than setting 
down inflexible guidelines. When pressed for guidelines in 
the O'Driscoll case, cited at page 16 of plaintiff's brief, 
the Commission explained this policy: 
"The Commission has for years, labored 
with problems of this (35-1-69) section 
and has endeavored to interpret what con-
stitutes 'substantially greater.1 The 
guidelines of what 'substantially greater' 
means are elusive and difficult, even 
among the Commissioners. The Commission 
has not formulated a written policy re-
garding this matter, although in private 
discussions reference has been made to a 
50% and a 40% figure. Said percentages 
were discussed in terms of the amount of 
percentage the industrial accident had 
to contribute before it became "sub-
stantially greater" within the meaning 
intended in the Workmen's Compensation 
law. The Commission had endeavored to 
treat each case individually with the 
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idea in mind that each case would 
stand on its own facts, with no 
particular immovable policy being 
S6i# » i » 
It is thus amply clear the Commission is trying to re-
main flexible on this statute, in an effort to work equitable 
results# as the business of determining percentages of a 
man's disability is subjective at best. 
Yet, plaintiff's counsel argues on pg. 21 of their brief 
that: 
"If the Commission is sustained 
here, every worker with greater than 
50% prior disability should be dis-
qualified for any subsequent injury 
of 49% or less, since the second in-
jury cannot be substantially greater 
arithmetically. Such arbitrary crit-
eria makes the statute inoperative." 
Contrary to what plaintiff's counsel argues here, it is 
abundantly clear from the Commission's language in the O'Driscoll 
case, cited supra, and in the plaintiff's own brief—that the 
40-50 percent range is merely a general guideline, and not an 
"immovable standard." 
Next, plaintiff attacks the reference to California 
statutes by the Industrial Commission, stating that such 
statutes are not relevant here. (pg. 19 Appellant's brief). 
Upon closer examination of what the Industrial Commission is 
actually doing, it is plain that there is nothing wrong with 
the Commission referring to a California statute for assistance 
in interpreting a Utah statute. 
The Utah statute itself is broad and general, yet the 
Industrial Commission, by mandate of the legislature, must 
interprete it. The commission has for the most part been 
left to its own means in doing so. Thus, because California 
has codified some specific guidelines in their workmen's com-
pensation statute, the Utah Industrial Commission has turned 
to California, just as courts often look to other jurisdictions, 
to get some guidance in how other states have handled similiar 
statutory interpretation problems. Thus, far from being un-
lawful, the Commission's reference to the California statute 
is reasonable, and an indication of the Commission's attempt 
to act in good faith. 
No where has the Commission adopted the California 
standard as its own, but even if they did, this would not be 
improper. Due to the broadness of the statute in question, 
and the powers vested in the Industrial Commission, it appears 
that the Commission is free to adopt any reasonable standard 
of interpretation of the law. 
Further, there is statutory and case law that gives 
great deference to orders and decisions of the Industrial 
Commission.. U.C.A. 35-1-20 states: 
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"Orders of commission—Presumed lawful— 
All orders of the commission within its 
jurisdiction shall be presumed reasonable 
and lawful until they are found otherwise 
in an action brought for that purpose, or 
until altered or revoked by the commission.11 
It appears that here the legislature has given the 
orders of the Industrial Commission a statutory presumption of 
lawfulness. Likewise, we urge the Court in the instant case, 
barring any evidence presented by plaintiff that the Commission 
abused its discretion, should uphold the presumption and not 
disturb the Commission's findings. 
As to review of Industrial Commission hearings and orders, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has a long history of 
giving great deference to the Commission's findings. Just a 
few of many cases in this line of decisions include: 
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission 20 P.2d 618, 621, 
81 U. 511, the Court said: "A broad discretion is vested in 
the Industrial Commission by statute with respect to the manner 
in which its investigations shall be conducted. Unless it is 
shown that some substantial right of a party has been denied 
him, or that he has been deprived of an opportunity to fairly 
and fully develop his case, this court will not interfere to 
direct the method of conducting such hearings or investigations." 
In Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
196 P. 853, 856, 57 U. 589, The Utah Supreme Court stated: "This 
court is now firmly committed to the doctrine that it will ex-
amine into the evidence only to ascertain whether there is any 
substantial evidence in support of the findings of its commis-
sion and whether it has either acted without or in excess of 
its jurisdiction." 
And again, in Utah Console Mining Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 240 P. 440, 441, 66 U. 173, the Utah High Court 
reaffirmed their long standing policy: 
"This court has consistently and persistently held that 
our powers are limited to the determination of whether the 
Commission has exceeded its powers or has disregarded some 
positive provision of law in making or in denying an award." 
And finally, the Court said in Ostler v. Industrial 
Commission 84 U. 428, 36 P.2d 95: 
"Unless upon the whole record it 
can be said that the Commission acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making 
its findings, this court under the 
statute is without authority to inter-
fere. It is not for this court in 
matters of evidence to interfere or to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission unless it is made clearly to 
appear that the Commission has miscon-
strued or misapplied the provisions of 
the statute; but if such is made to 
appear, then it becomes the duty of the 
court to correct the same. Where there 
is substantial competent evidence to 
support an award, it will not be dis-
turbed, likewise when there is no sub-
stantial competent evidence to support 
an award or an order denying an award, 
it is held the award or order must be 
affirmed, not because the Commission 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously, 
but because of the insufficiency of 
competent evidence. It is said in 
this regard that "the commission may 
not without sufficient cause arbi-
trarily refuse to follow the uncontra-
dicted evidence, yet, before this 
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court can say that the commission 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously :' 
in the matter, it must be made 
clearly to appear that such was 
in fact the case." Kavalinakis v. 
Ind. Comm. et al., 67 Utah, 174, 
246 P. 698, 701? Hauser v. Ind. 
Comirw, 77 Utah, 419, 296 P. 780." 
Defendant Industrial Commission respectfully submits 
that their guidelines are not arbitrary or capracious as 
plaintiff contends, that plaintiff failed to produce any 
evidence or facts to support his claim to that effect, and 
that therefore the court should affirm the Commission's order 
in accordance with long standing Supreme Court policy. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT 
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY BASING ITS 
ORDER ON ARBITRARY GUIDELINES, THE 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR REHEARING. 
Even assuming arguendo that the State Industrial 
Commission abused its discretion by making decisions in this 
case on arbitrary guidelines, the appropriate remedy is to 
remand the case to the commission for rehearing. The reason 
for this is twofold: first, the Court may possibly find a 
need for further evidentiary hearings concerning Mr. McPhie's 
injuries based on a new court enunciated guidelines. And 
second, because United States Steel Corporation is not re-
presented in this hearing on appeal, remanding the case would 
give them an opportunity to adequately protect their interests 
in the case. 
Defendant Commission strongly urges the court, however, 
to affirm the commission's order, as based on the facts of 
this case, it is unlikely any better result can be reached on 
rehearing* Our argument will endeavor to explicate this point. 
Section 35-1-69 provides that certain benefits be paid 
to an employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapa-
city by accident, disease or congenital causes, who then 
sustains an industrial injury which results in permanent in-
capacity substantially greater than he would have incurred if 
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity. These benefits 
are to be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries but 
the liability of the employer and/or insurance carrier shall 
be for the industrial injury only, and the remainder shall be 
paid out of the special fund. 
The law then provides that a Medical Panel be set up 
to determine: 
1. The total permanent physical impairment from all 
causes. 
2. The percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury. 
3. The percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the pre-existing condition* 
After the above determinations have been made, the 
Commission shall then assess the liability for payment of 
benefits — the employer and/or insurance carrier shall pay 
the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid 
out of the special fund. 
The medical panel mentioned supra, found inter alia in 
its Medical Panel Report finding (R. 202, 203), "7. Mr. McPhie 
does have a significant functional component to his problem 
at the present time." 
Within the law of Workmen's Compensation, "functional 
component" or as it is sometimes called, "functional overlay," 
has a specialized meaning. In Quednan v. Langrish 137 A.2d 
544, 548, 144 Conn. 706, it was defined as such: 
"The term 'functional overlay' ap-
pears to be a substitute for 'psychogenic 
overlay,' which has been definded as 'the 
•emontionally determined increment to an 
existing symptom or disability which has 
been of an organic or physically traumatic 
origin." Laughlin, Meuroses in Clinical 
Practice, p. 732. 
See also Words and Phrases volume 17a pg. 539, "Functional 
Overlay", and volume 35 pg. 12 "Psychogenic Overlay." 
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Basically then, the functional component of an injury 
is the emotional or psychiatric harm that results from the 
industrial injury, but is not physical in nature resulting 
directly from the industrial accident. Nevertheless, the 
functional component can be severe in a given case, and con-
tribute substantially to a workman's overall disability. 
Thus, applying this to the facts of the instant case, 
perhaps Mr. McPhie is in fact entitled to a determination of 
a higher percentage of disability than the 15 percent that 
was previously determined by the medical panel as attribut-
table to the July 2 3, 1972 accident. We base this conclusion 
on the language found in Dr. Alan Jeppsen's letter of psychia-
tric evaluation of Mr. McPhie (R. 204, 205) which states in 
pertinent part: 
"In answering question number 
seven from the Industrial Commission, 
Mr. McPhie does have a significant 
functional component to his problem at ".\-
the present time, Mr. McPhie had a 
chronic pain syndrome in 1966 follow-
ing his accident. I This predisposed 
him to have another traumatic neurosis 
develop after this recent injury to 
his cervical spine. I think on top of 
that, his impaired mental functioning 
predisposed him to focus on this limita-
tion as an explanation of his poor 
functioning. The accident of July 2 3, 
1972 would have to be considered the 
precipitating and aggravating event." 
(Emphasis added) 
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It appears from this language that the "significant 
functional component" referred to may well in fact constitute 
a substantial part of Mr. McPhie's total disability. But, 
more importantly to the issue at hand, it also appears that 
this functional component may not have been present prior to 
the July 23, 1972 accident* 
Now, according to U.C.A. 35-1-69 as amended, if the 
significant functional impairment did not exist before the 
July 2 3# 1972 accident, then the employer, (United States 
Steel Corporation or its insurance carrier) would be re-
sponsible for the liability accrueing from the injury. This 
is because the special fund as explained earlier, only pays 
for that amount of the total disability that was pre-existing 
to the industrial accident* The employer, U.S. Steel Corp., 
or its insurance carrier, is responsible for that percentage 
of the injury that results concurrent or subsequent to the 
accident, such as the functional component overlay. 
Thus in the instant case, much of Mr. McPhie's total 
disability is directly related to his functional overlay, as 
explained in Dr. Jeppson's letter. Likewise, there is a very 
strong possibility that the functional overlay created liability 
the employer or his insurance carrier should bear, if the over-
lay is a result of the July 2 3, 1972 injury* and was not, as 
required by U.C.A. 35-1-69, pre-existing to the Industrial 
accident. However, since United States Steel is not re-
presented in this appeal, we therefore respectfully submit 
if the court finds that the Commission abused its discretion 
and made its order in the instant case based on arbitrary 
guidelines, then the case should be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for an evidentiary hearing on the subject of the 
functional component overlay. This would be to determine 
when it occurred, i.e. prior to or subsequent to the July 23, 
1972 accident, and what proportion of Mr. McPhie's total 
disability the functional component overlay consisted of, 
over and above the 15 percent that has already been determined 
as resultant from the July 1972 accident. 
The purpose of such a new hearing, if found necessary 
by the court, would be to re-examine the evidence relating to 
the functional component; however, defendants strongly urge 
against such a rehearing, due to the facts in the instant case. 
In the commission's conclusions of law (R. 228) the Commission 
stated: 
"Considering Claimant's prior 
history and complaints, and con-
sidering the multiple problems 
following the July 2 3, 1972 
accident, the various hospitaliza-
tion, diagnostic efforts and 
cervical surgery were not unreason-
able under the circumstances. The 
Medical Panel concluded that much 
-13-
of Claimant's disability was 
attributable to previously exist-
ing, co-existing and subsequent 
conditions. They also concluded 
that it was impossible to separate 
into distinct categories the var-
ious aspects or components of 
Claimant's permanent impairment 
because of the significant func-
tional component being involved 
in the problem." (Emphasis added). 
Despite this language, if the court finds a new hearing 
is in order, it would appear necessary for the commission to 
re-evaluate the claimant's injuries in the context of new 
guidelines set out by the court, to prevent saddling either 
U.S. Steel or the Special Fund with the entire amount of 
liability. 
Nevertheless, it must be concluded that the instant 
facts make for a hard case, because as stated by the Commis-
sion supra, they believed it to be impossible to properly 
apportion the various aspects or components of the claimant's 
injuries to before or after the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission has taken a very hard set of 
facts, and has tried to come to an equitable settlement for 
the claimant. The Commission has acted in good faith, inter-
preting and applying the state statute to the best of their 
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ability. Unless there is some evidence that there has been 
a clear abuse of discretion by the Commission, the Supreme 
Court should allow the Commission's order to stand. Further 
even should the court find such an abuse of discretion, the 
proper remedy is to remand the case to be heard in the context 
of court established guidelines. Nevertheless, we respectfully 
urge the court to let this Commission order stand as is. We 
likewise respectfully urge that if any new guidelines or 
changes are to be made in the statute, this is in the province 
of the legislature to establish such guidelines or changes, 
DATED this t* day of May, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted. 
VERNON B, ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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